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The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation 
Act of 1996 (PRWORA) dramatically changed the financial arrange 
ment between the federal government and the states concerning cash 
assistance for poor families. Previously, Aid to Families with Depen 
dent Children (AFDC) was jointly financed by the two levels of gov 
ernment through a federal matching-rate grant at an average matching 
rate to the states of about 60 percent. Under this arrangement, when 
the economy contracted and AFDC spending rose, the federal govern 
ment was responsible for 60 cents of each dollar in increased spending 
in the average state. Under the new arrangement, the federal govern 
ment provides a fixed amount under a block grant set equal to the level 
of the federal AFDC grant amount in 1994. Because most states had 
relatively high case loads and correspondingly high spending in 1994, 
the block grant amounts are quite generous relative to Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) spending requirements in the 
prosperous years since passage of the 1996 act, but prosperous times 
will not last forever. Under this new arrangement, when the economy 
next contracts and the demand for income assistance increases, the 
states will be solely responsible for each dollar increase in spending on 
cash assistance.
Our purpose in this paper is to speculate on the cyclically of state 
fiscal responses under this new regime. In particular, how will they 
respond during the next recession? We draw lessons from several 
strands of the literature, including estimates of the spending responses 
of governments to matching and block grants, and we consider some 
new evidence. We also summarize studies that examine the incentives 
states have to mimic their neighbors' spending levels, as well as studies
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of the substitutability of spending across programs. We conclude that 
the "price effect" of the shift from matching grants to block grants is 
likely to be small, at least in the short run; that the strength of the 
"neighbor effect," and thus the likelihood of a race to the bottom, is 
also small if not uncertain; and that the evidence that different welfare 
programs are close substitutes for one another in a state's budget is 
suggestive, but tentative.
We also review the literature on how state revenues and expendi 
tures vary over the business cycle and during contractionary periods. 
This research, although recent and sparse, generally finds that states 
that rely on progressive income taxes and narrowly based sales taxes 
have revenue systems that exhibit high cyclical variability. Thus, dur 
ing economic contractions, such states are less able to maintain spend 
ing programs without adjusting tax rates upward. Definitive evidence 
on spending is more difficult to come by because of the difficulty of 
generating policy-free measures of expenditures. Still, part of the 
interest is in examining the decisions made by policymakers in the face 
of recession; preliminary evidence indicates that most states maintain 
or increase spending (and revenues) virtually across the board in con 
tractions. While this finding of countercyclical spending is not surpris 
ing for the matching-rate program (AFDC), it is interesting that other 
state spending not stimulated by matching rates also tends to be coun 
tercyclical. Cautious speculation based on these findings, coupled with 
the emerging consensus that the price effect may be small in the short 
run, leads us to hazard a guess that state spending on welfare may not 
decline as greatly as some have predicted when the next recession 
occurs.
Trends in state and local welfare spending from 1980 to 1995 are 
displayed in Table 1. As shown in the first column, cash assistance as a 
share of total expenditures fell from 3.3 percent in 1980 to 2.2 percent 
in 1994. It is particularly notable that cash assistance declined as a 
share of the budget between 1990 and 1995, despite a sharp increase in 
the number of recipients. The decline reflects cuts in the maximum 
benefit over this period and the decision by a number of states to drop 
their General Assistance programs during the recession. 1
In contrast to cash assistance, total welfare expenditures grew as a 
share of state and local expenditures, from 10.5 percent in 1980 to 14.3 
percent in 1995. The increase was particularly pronounced in the
Table 1 State and Local Outlays on Public Welfare3
Total state and local expenditures on public welfare State and local own-source expenditures on public welfare1*














































Source: Personal income. Economic Report of the President, 1998, Table B-2. Total state and local expenditures: Statistical Abstract of 
the United States, 1998, Table #499 and 1989, Table #446. Public welfare expenditures, own-source revenues, and public welfare from 
federal government. Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1998, Table #506 and 1989, Table #453. Cash assistance: Statistical 
Abstract of the United States 1998, Table #508, and U.S. House of Representatives 1996, Table 8-1.
a Public welfare includes both cash assistance to needy persons and vendor payments for medical care and other services to needy per 
sons; it excludes completely federal welfare programs, such as food stamps.
b State and local expenditures on public welfare minus federal intergovernmental revenues for public welfare.
c Own-source revenues include taxes and other non-intergovernmental grant revenue sources, such as charges and fines.
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1990s, increasing from 11.3 percent to 14.3 percent. Welfare expendi 
tures also grew as a share of personal income, increasing by almost a 
percentage point between 1990 and 1995. The increase in total welfare 
spending is due primarily to the rapid growth in Medicaid, reflecting an 
increase in mandated coverage, increases in utilization and reimburse 
ment, and rapid medical price inflation (Coughlin, Ku, and Holahan 
1994). State and local own contributions to cash assistance also fell 
from 1980 to 1995, while own contributions to total welfare spending 
increased slightly, from 5.6 percent of own-source revenues in 1980 to 
6.5 percent in 1995.
LESSONS FROM THE LITERATURE ON GRANTS-IN-AID 
AND COMPETITION AMONG NEIGHBORING STATES
In this section, we describe federal and state cash assistance pro 
grams and we review the literature on the effects of matching and 
block grants on spending, neighborhood effects, and program substitu 
tion.
Federal Financial Incentives for Cash Assistance Programs
Under the TANF program, states receive a block grant that is 
approximately fixed in nominal terms. TANF replaced the AFDC pro 
gram, which provided open-ended matching assistance to states. To 
receive its full block grant allocation, a state is required to contribute 
overall state funding equal to at least 80 percent of the sum of FY 1994 
expenditures on AFDC, JOBS, emergency assistance, and welfare- 
related child care programs; this is known as the Maintenance of Effort 
(MOE) requirement. 2 Not only do states lose a dollar of TANF funds 
for every dollar they fall below the MOE requirement, but they are then 
obliged to raise spending beyond the MOE level to offset the federal 
penalty.
In the AFDC program, the mean federal matching rate was 60 per 
cent, with states paying 40 cents for an additional dollar of cash assis 
tance. With TANF, the marginal price has risen to 1. If the stimulative 
price effect of open-ended matching aid exceeds the lump-sum grant
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effect for nonmatching categorical assistance, then over time one 
would expect TANF to induce a substantial reduction in state spending 
on cash assistance.
Given the price increase, the crucial parameters in predicting and 
explaining the expenditure response of states to the TANF block grants 
are the elasticity of benefits and of total expenditures with respect to 
the matching rate. These elasticities must be compared with the expen 
diture response per dollar of nonmatching categorical aid for welfare. 
The price elasticity can, in principle, be estimated using variations in 
state matching rates. However, we have no direct experience with cash 
assistance as a block grant, so to predict the effect of the block grant, 
we must also examine the state spending response to nonmatching aid 
for other categories of welfare spending.
State spending on AFDC or TANF is also influenced by the avail 
ability and benefit levels of other federal welfare programs. The exist 
ence of multiple programs with overlapping coverage and differential 
federal financial sharing rules provides a fiscal incentive for states to 
substitute among programs, with the goal of maximizing the federal 
contribution per dollar of own resources. The strongest incentive for 
substitution is between the federally funded Food Stamp and Supple 
mental Security Income programs and cash assistance. Almost all 
recipients of cash assistance are eligible for and receive food stamp 
benefits. Because food stamps are close to cash in their effect on recip 
ient budgets, state policymakers are likely to view the two forms of 
assistance as fairly close substitutes. Food stamps are indexed to infla 
tion and impose an implicit tax on recipients in terms of reducing food 
stamps by 30 cents for each additional dollar of cash benefits provided 
by the states. This tax implies that, so long as the level of cash assis 
tance under AFDC or TANF exceeds the food stamp disregard of $134 
per month, the cost to the states of raising total cash benefits by a dollar 
is approximately $1.43. 3
At any point in time, few AFDC/TANF recipients also receive ben 
efits under the federal Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) (Liebman 
1996). Hence, for any given recipient, states cannot directly substitute 
the EITC for cash benefits, as they can in the case of food stamps. 
However, the expansion in EITC benefits in the 1990s has substantially 
increased the value to TANF recipients of moving from not working to 
part-time work (Coe et al. 1998). The lower a state's cash benefit level,
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the greater the increase in family income from part-time work. By 
contrast, a low-benefit reduction rate as earned income increases tends 
to reinforce the EITC work incentive. Thus, the decisions of a number 
of states to both decrease their maximum benefit levels and increase 
their income disregards may be partly a response to the EITC. 4
Previous Estimates of Matching-Rate Price Effects
Benefit Levels
Many studies attempt to explain variation among states and over 
time in AFDC benefit levels, caseloads, total spending, and spending 
on welfare more broadly defined. AFDC benefits (total expenditures) 
are assumed to depend on state income, the federal matching rate, 
demographic controls, and, in some models, other welfare programs 
and benefit levels in neighboring states.
The major studies have been summarized in several review papers 
(Chernick 1998; Ribar and Wilhelm 1999). Results from some fre 
quently cited studies are shown in Table 2, which reports estimates of 
the income and price elasticities and of the food stamp substitution 
effect. There is considerable variation in the estimated elasticities. 
The price elasticity is relatively large in Baicker's (1998) analysis of 
the period 1948-1963, in the Gramlich and Laren study (1984), and in 
a Craig and Inman (1986) analysis of total welfare expenditures. By 
contrast, price elasticities are small, and sometimes positive, in Moffitt 
(1990) and the Ribar and Wilhelm papers (1994, 1999).
Ribar and Wilhelm (1994, 1999) provided a careful econometric 
review and replication of most of the studies of AFDC benefit level 
determination. They concluded not only that matching rate effects are 
small, but also that, controlling for unobserved characteristics of states 
through state fixed effects and common national trends through year 
dummies, income elasticities are substantially less than 1. For exam 
ple, in an OLS specification, they found that the income coefficient is 
reduced from 0.593 to 0.357 with the addition of state fixed effects. 
The general implication of the Ribar-Wilhelm analysis is that state 
AFDC benefit levels are much less sensitive to economic variables than 
earlier studies indicated.
The Gramlich and Laren (1984) estimates, which received consid 
erable attention, found large effects of federal matching rates and sub-
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stantial neighbor effects. Their model is based on the concept that 
while more recipients increases the cost of raising benefit levels, higher 
benefits in turn increase the number of recipients, both from within a 
state and by encouraging migration from other states. The conven 
tional way to estimate such a model is to find variables that affect ben 
efits but not the number of recipients and other variables that affect 
recipients but not benefits. Such variables serve as instruments to iden 
tify the two equations. Given the difficulty in finding acceptable 
instruments, Gramlich and Laren estimated a reduced form model 
using the same variables (income, price, unemployment, and neighbor 
benefits) for each equation. They then used the model's structure to 
infer the extent to which the pure price and income effects on benefit 
levels are dampened by the fact that any increase in benefit levels 
brings with it an increase in the number of recipients.
Gramlich and Laren's model was estimated for the period 1974- 
1981 and used a restricted sample of 33 states that were on the open- 
ended Medicaid matching formula at that time. Chernick (1999) rees- 
timates the Gramlich-Laren model for the period 1984 to 1995, using 
the full sample of states. This reestimation yields substantially lower 
price elasticities than in the earlier period, and higher income elastici 
ties. Price effects are significant at conventional levels only when the 
dependent variable includes food stamps. In general, reestimation sup 
ports the conclusion of Ribar and Wilhelm that price effects are small 
in the 1980s and 1990s.
Total Welfare Spending
The evidence suggests that higher benefit levels lead to higher 
numbers of recipients (Blank 1997). Therefore, if higher federal 
matching rates do have a positive effect on benefit levels, we would 
expect matching rates to have a bigger effect on total spending than on 
benefit levels alone. While studies using data from earlier periods 
(Gramlich and Larenl984; Craig and Inman 1986; Baicker 1998) sup 
port this expectation, more recent evidence does not. For example, 
Moffitt, Ribar, and Wilhelm (1998) found that the elasticity of AFDC 
expenditures with respect to the state share is -0.1, while Craig (1993) 
found no effect of matching grants on AFDC expenditures. The small 
effects in the Moffitt, Ribar, and Wilhelm study reflect the very low 
estimated price elasticities for benefits; in the Craig study, they reflect
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the offsetting effect of higher matching rates raising benefit levels but 
lowering caseloads. This evidence reinforces the conclusion that, on 
average, the short-run effects of eliminating matching rates will be 
small.
Estimation Issues
The AFDC matching rate (the Federal Medicaid Assistance Per 
centage) is inversely correlated with state personal income per capita. 
Collinearity is not perfect because the formula sets an upper bound for 
the state share at 50 percent. This collinearity makes it difficult to dis 
entangle the true price and income effects. We can write the benefit 
equation as
Eq.l InB = a l \nS + a2 lnY(S)
where B is the benefit level, S is state share, and Y is state income per 
capita. 7(5) is the inverse of the formula determining the relationship 
between state share and income. The estimated price effect will be 
equal to
Because £YS is negative, the stronger the income elasticity a2, the 
smaller will be the estimated price effect. In typical specifications of 
the benefit model, both state share and income have significant positive 
effects on benefit levels. Once state fixed effects and time variables are 
controlled for, the coefficient on state share remains positive but has a 
much smaller size and is no longer significant.
One way to identify the price effect is to define price as the (per 
capita) cost of raising benefits by a dollar for all recipients:
Eq.3 p = (l-™)
where m is the federal matching rate, R is the number of recipients, and 
N is the population. This approach imposes the restriction that the
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marginal effect of a change in the matching rate be the same as the 
effect of a change in the number of recipients. However, if the 
response to a matching rate change is not the same as a response to 
variation in the recipient ratio, then it is incorrect to infer the effect of 
matching rate changes from this multiplicative term. A second prob 
lem is that the recipient ratio is endogenous to benefit level decisions, 
imparting an upward bias to the estimated price effect. Ribar and Wil- 
helm (1999) presented an extensive set of tests of for price exogeneity. 
They concluded that their findings of modest income effects and weak 
price effects are not very sensitive to the choice of instruments.
An alternative approach to identifying the matching rate effect is to 
exploit the fact that the matching rate has a lower bound of 50 percent. 
For the 11 states at this lower bound (in 1996) it is possible to estimate 
a pure income effect. This method, proposed by Craig (1993), yields a 
significant matching rate effect on AFDC benefit levels for the period 
1965-1989. However, in a replication of the Craig study for the period 
1981-1995, Chernick (1999) finds that the matching rate has no effect 
on either benefits or total expenditures.
A Consensus of Sorts
A prior review paper (Chernick 1998) concluded that the appropri 
ate range for the price elasticity estimates was from 0.2 to 0.3. These 
estimates imply a predicted decline in average benefit levels as a result 
of shifting from matching to block grants of somewhere between 15 
and 30 percent, and a slightly higher decline in total expenditures. The 
high-end estimates from the literature, which would imply reductions 
in spending of as much as 75 percent, are rejected by Chernick because 
they used selected sub-samples of states and failed to identify the key 
parameters. Very low estimates are rejected on the grounds that the 
price term (state share times the recipient ratio) was misspecified.
The econometric evidence on matching rate effects is buttressed by 
considering state fiscal responses to the federal SSI program, estab 
lished in 1974. SSI is similar in fiscal structure to a block grant. The 
analysis found that when public assistance to the aged, blind, and dis 
abled (AABD) was converted from a matching grant to states to an 
indexed grant going directly to individuals, states responded by gradu 
ally reducing their share of total funding and their absolute dollar com-
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mitment. By 1996, the value of state supplementation had fallen by 21 
percent.
The most recent statistical analyses find lower matching rate elas 
ticities, ranging from zero to about 0.15. Chernick (1999) attempts to 
replicate the major prior studies with data from 1983 to 1995 and finds 
that estimated elasticities were smaller than before. The reduced effects 
of matching could reflect a real behavioral change in how states respond 
to federal matching rate subsidies, or they could reflect an increase in 
the offsetting role of state income in determining benefits and expendi 
tures. The implicit food stamp tax on AFDC, by raising the price of 
benefits in all states, may further obscure the role of matching rate vari 
ation in state spending decisions. Taken at face value, the matching rate 
estimates imply that the equilibrium reduction in average benefit levels 
from ending the matching subsidy would be no more than approxi 
mately 10 percent. This reduction would in turn imply a reduction in 
the state contribution to cash assistance of at most 25 percent.
However, this conclusion is subject to a number of caveats. First, 
the increase in the price of cash assistance under the block grant is far 
larger than the prior variation in price under the AFDC program. Our 
only recent experience with such a substantial change comes from the 
SSI program, and (as discussed above) this program has been accom 
panied by a substantial decline in state contributions. This decline is 
particularly telling in that SSI recipients are mostly viewed as the 
"deserving poor," and are likely to be treated more favorably by states 
than mothers on welfare. Historical analyses (Wallis and Gates 1998; 
Baicker 1998) suggest that matching grants played a crucial role in 
expanding state commitments to assist the needy. These analyses sug 
gest that the relatively small predictions from the recent literature, 
while they may be a good guide to the short run behavior of states, 
probably underestimate the long-run expenditure adjustments that will 
take place under the TANF block grant.
A second caveat is that the TANF legislation gives states much 
greater flexibility in determining public assistance spending. Under 
AFDC, the main margin along which spending could be adjusted was 
changes in benefit levels, while under TANF there are more margins of 
response. For example, states can set shorter time limits and adjust 
income disregards. Some states have saved money by setting shorter 
time limits but spent money by allowing recipients to keep more of
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each dollar earned. These changes make it more difficult to use fiscal 
response parameters estimated under the prior regime as predictors of 
behavior under the block grants.
The initial fiscal response to TANF has been dominated by a sharp 
drop in caseloads. Between 1994 and mid 1998, AFDC/TANF case 
loads fell by 40 percent, and by June of 1998 were at their lowest level 
since 1972. This sharp drop, due partly to the strong economy and 
partly to state policy choices (Levine and Whitmore 1998; Blank 1997; 
Figlio and Ziliak 1998) means that public assistance costs have 
declined dramatically in most states. Because the state MOE require 
ment must be satisfied in each year, while federal TANF funds can be 
banked for use in future years, states have tended to use their own 
funds first to satisfy the MOE and then draw down TANF funds. 5 Thus, 
the drop in state spending under TANF is primarily a reflection of 
declining caseloads rather than the long-run response to the price effect 
of the block grants.
Neighbor Effects
If there is significant mobility of potential recipients in response to 
benefit level differentials, then welfare spending in each state may be 
influenced by spending in neighbor or competitor states. Even if actual 
migration effects are small, state politicians may feel particularly vul 
nerable to the charge that the state is attracting indigents from other 
states by virtue of its generous benefits. This interdependence could be 
exacerbated by the fact that under TANF the federal government will 
no longer share in any increase in state expenditures, while states will 
realize 100% of the savings from reduced spending.
A simple test of whether competitive pressures have increased in 
recent years is to examine variation in benefit levels across states. 
Between 1984 and 1995, the mean of state maximum benefits adjusted 
for inflation declined by about 10 percent, but the coefficient of varia 
tion remained at 36 percent. However, the variation in AFDC benefits 
plus food stamps was not only lower than for AFDC alone but showed 
some decline, from 19 percent to 16 percent. This suggests that in the 
1980s and 1990s there has been a small amount of convergence in the 
total benefit package across states.
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The most powerful test for the race to the bottom would come from 
evidence that the number of recipients in a given state is positively 
affected by benefit differentials between that state and its "neighbors," 
however defined. A weaker test would be provided by evidence that 
benefit levels move in tandem with those of their neighbors. The latter 
evidence is more difficult to interpret. Such behavior could represent 
one state responding to the decisions of other states; alternatively, it 
could imply that both are subject to common economic or political 
influences.
Evidence on the migration effect is mixed. Aggregate studies cov 
ering the 1980s and early 1990s show no evidence that a state's ratio of 
AFDC recipients to population was sensitive to benefit level differen 
tials, whereas there is some evidence of sensitivity in prior periods. 
(Gramlich and Laren 1984; Ribar and Wilhelm 1994; Shroder 1995). 
Among the aggregate studies, both Gramlich and Laren (1984) and 
Ribar and Wilhelm (1994) found that AFDC recipiency ratios are sen 
sitive to neighbors' AFDC benefit levels in the period 1976 to 1981. 
However, data from the 1980s (Ribar and Wilhelm 1994; Schroder 
1995; Craig 1993) exhibit no such evidence. The lack of effect could 
reflect the narrowing of the combined AFDC-food stamp differentials 
referred to above.
Using micro data to study the interstate migration effect, Gramlich 
and Laren (1984) and Blank (1988) found that in the 1970s, though 
only a very small proportion of welfare recipients move between states 
in any given year, those moves are much more likely to be from low- 
benefit to high-benefit states. Levine and Zimmerman (1995), cover 
ing the period 1979-1992, and Walker (1994), using 1980 data, found 
little or no support for the welfare magnet theory. Borjas (1997) found 
that recent immigrants are disproportionately attracted by California's 
high benefit levels. Reviewing these papers, Brueckner (1998) noted 
the contradictory nature of the evidence on welfare migration. Except 
for the Borjas study of immigrants in a single state, the evidence does 
not indicate an increase in such migration in the 1980s.
The evidence on strategic interaction between states in benefit lev 
els is stronger than the direct evidence on migration. For the 1980s, 
Ribar and Wilhelm (1994) found that a dollar increase in geographic 
neighbor benefits leads to an increase in own benefits that ranges from 
23 to 55 cents. In a recent review paper, Brueckner (1998) cited papers
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by Figlio, Wolpin, and Reid (1998) and Saavedra (1998) as providing 
"strong evidence that a given state's benefit choice is affected by bene 
fit levels in nearby states." A consensus estimate from this literature 
would be that a dollar change in neighbor benefits leads to about a 30- 
cent change in own benefits.
In Chernick's (1999) investigations of the neighbor effect, the 
neighbor results are found to be quite sensitive to specification. For 
example, when both own and neighbor benefits are measured by com 
bined AFDC plus food stamp benefits and the model is estimated in 
first-difference form, neighbor effects have a negative rather than a 
positive effect on own benefits. When maximum AFDC benefits are 
adjusted for implicit tax rates, the neighbor effect is insignificant. 
Instrumental variables estimation yields similar results. It is only when 
published maximum benefits is the benefit measure that the strong stra 
tegic interaction effect is apparent. These preliminary results suggest 
that in the most visible aspect of welfare policy, the maximum benefit, 
changes are indeed copied by neighbor states. However, using a 
broader measure of state "generosity," the links are much weaker.
Even if neighbor effects are important, it is not an automatic impli 
cation that the block grants will lead to a race to the bottom. A neces 
sary condition for that race to occur is for the price elasticity to be of 
some reasonable magnitude. If the price response is small, then even if 
the interstate competition effects are potentially large, the leapfrogging 
effect of a race to the bottom will not be triggered. Because the con 
sensus price elasticity estimates are rather low, this suggests that the 
block grant alone will not be sufficient to kick off a strong race to the 
bottom.
Program Substitution
As discussed above, the fact that most AFDC recipients are auto 
matically eligible for food stamps and Medicaid provides an opportu 
nity and an incentive for states to substitute both of these programs for 
cash benefits. Several studies suggest that this substitution is important. 
Moffitt (1990) argued that observed declines in AFDC benefits 
could reflect a substitution of food stamps and Medicaid for AFDC, 
rather than a decrease in generosity towards the poor. To test this 
hypothesis, he compared combined benefits for AFDC, food stamps,
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and Medicaid in 1984 to the benefit level that would be predicted based 
on an earlier year (1960), prior to the introduction of food stamps and 
Medicaid. He found that actual benefit levels for the sum of AFDC, 
food stamps, and Medicaid were within $10 of predicted benefit levels. 
In a replication of the Moffitt approach for the years 1983 and 1993, 
Chernick (1999) finds that the 1983 structure overpredicts the 1993 
combined AFDC, food stamp, and Medicaid benefits by between 7.5 
and 9 percent. Thus, in the period 1983 to 1993, program substitution 
can explain most (but not all) of the decline in AFDC benefits.
The Moffitt and Chernick findings are relevant to PRWORA 
because they show substantial program substitution even when cash 
assistance was matched by federal dollars. With the conversion of fed 
eral aid for cash assistance from matching to lump-sum grants and the 
fact that states can now use a portion of the block grant money for in- 
kind expenses such as child care and training, we expect even stronger 
substitution in favor of Medicaid and food stamps under PRWORA.
Recent research by Katherine Baicker investigated federal man 
dates aimed at changing state spending on specific categories of wel 
fare and their effect on state budget allocations across other categories 
of spending. This research is relevant to understanding the implica 
tions of PRWORA, because the act requires states to move recipients 
into employment, a requirement that is likely to involve increased 
spending by states on training, placement, and child care. In an exami 
nation of the effect of federal Medicaid expansions on state budgets 
over the period 1983 to 1995, Baicker (1998) found that states tended 
to accommodate required increases in spending for health care for the 
indigent by decreasing spending on other components of the broader 
state welfare budget. State tax revenues and spending on nonwelfare 
categories of the state budget were largely unaffected. These results 
should be treated with caution because of difficulties in interpreting the 
data on Medicaid spending. Nonetheless, the findings indicate some 
amount of "stickiness" in state budgets; i.e., federally mandated 
increases on one program for the needy are likely to result in state deci 
sions to decrease spending on related programs, in some cases without 
much of an effect on overall welfare spending.
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THE VOLATILITY OF STATE REVENUES AND 
EXPENDITURES OVER THE BUSINESS CYCLE
The federal welfare reform debate and the resulting legislation, as 
well as state-instigated welfare changes enabled by federal waivers, 
have occurred against the backdrop of one of the longest continuous 
economic expansions in modern U.S. history. The inevitability of a 
recession at some point compels the question of how state welfare 
spending under the new policies is likely to respond to the accompany 
ing fiscal stress. Indeed, because of the strong economy, the switch 
from a matching grant under AFDC to a block grant under TANF will 
not have significant consequences for the states until the next recession 
occurs. A nascent literature examines the revenue-readiness of states 
to weather a turn in the business cycle, the fiscal experience of the 
states during previous recessions, and state spending on welfare over 
the business cycle.
Sobel and Holcombe (1996) used national measures of income and 
retail sales to proxy state revenue bases and estimated short-run elastic 
ities to capture the cycle-related variation in the major state tax 
sources. They found that corporate income is the most volatile compo 
nent of the tax base, followed by nonfood retail sales. Personal income 
and retail sales including food exhibit similar short-run elasticities of 
approximately 1, while motor fuel usage and liquor sales are the least 
volatile. The elasticity estimates are relatively stable over time and 
thus can be used to inform the design of tax policy to address future 
economic contingencies.
Dye and McGuire (1998) argued that the structure of state taxes is 
important to determining their volatility. They proxied the structures 
of the personal income and general sales taxes—the two largest reve 
nue raisers for state governments—of each of the 48 states having 
these taxes and estimated state-specific cyclical elasticities, assuming 
that each state's income distribution and personal consumption pat 
terns (the bases for the two taxes) are the same as those for the nation. 
Their analysis recognized that when the next recession occurs, the 
states will be responsible for any increase in spending beyond the level 
of the TANF block grant. Their aim was to assess which states are
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likely to be the most resilient to economic downturns (i.e., to have the 
least volatile revenues over the cycle).
The most salient feature of state personal income taxes for deter 
mining short-run elasticity is the progression in their rates; thus the 
building blocks of an estimate of the volatility of a state's income tax 
consist of different income categories. Dye and McGuire found that 
the short-run elasticity rises monotonically from near zero for the low 
est income group to over 4 percent for the highest income group. 
When they applied the different state tax structures to these income 
components, they found that the cyclical elasticity estimates for the 
individual income tax range from 0.95 to 1.68. Because of the mono- 
tonicity with respect to income brackets of the elasticity estimates, 
states with a greater degree of progression in their income tax systems 
(e.g., Connecticut and Nebraska) have more volatile income taxes.
A similar analysis for the general sales tax, where differential treat 
ment of various categories of spending distinguishes the different state 
tax structures, results in cyclical elasticity estimates for the general 
sales tax in the range of 0.85 to 1.37. The states with the most volatile 
sales taxes have narrow bases that exclude food for home consumption 
(e.g., Maryland and Vermont). California has both a progressive 
income tax and a narrow sales tax base, resulting in the distinction of 
having the highest cyclical elasticity for the combined income and 
sales taxes. By this measure, California is the state most vulnerable to 
the next recession and thus least able to pick up where federal block 
grant dollars will leave off.
Mattoon and Testa (1992) examined the fiscal experience of state 
and local governments during each contractionary period over the last 
50 years. They found that fiscal behavior is countercyclical (i.e., 
expenditures rise relative to revenues during downturns), indicating 
perhaps that elected officials are keen to maintain services in reces 
sions. Blackley and Deboer (1993) attempted to explain the decisions 
by states to increase revenues during the most recent 1990-1991 reces 
sion. They found that both political and economic forces were behind 
the discretionary state revenue increases of the early 1990s and that the 
depressing effect of the recession explained a fair portion of the reve 
nue increases.
Three recent papers examine welfare spending over the business 
cycle and during periods of contraction; they take quite different
294 Chernick and McGuire
approaches but present findings and conclusions that are mutually sup 
portive. Powers (1998) simulated spending on AFDC/TANF over a 
recent 20-year period under different financing scenarios and calcu 
lated a measure of variability that relates each state's expenditures on 
welfare to its unemployment rates. Boyd and Davis (1998) also simu 
lated spending on AFDC/TANF but restricted attention to the two 
recent recessionary periods. The third paper, by Dye and McGuire 
(forthcoming), examines actual state revenue and expenditure streams 
during state-specific business cycles and periods of recession.
Powers (1998) compared actual spending on AFDC over the period 
1976-1995 to simulated spending on TANF programs under two dif 
ferent assumptions about state responses to the shift in federal financ 
ing from a matching grant to a block grant. The "lower bound" 
simulations assume that states are quite sensitive to the price increase 
associated with the financing change and that states will choose to 
spend only the bare minimum required by the federal government. The 
optimistic "upper bound" simulations assume that each state will 
choose to maintain total spending on TANF programs to the level 
under the AFDC program regardless of the declining support of the 
fixed federal block grant over time (declining because of inflation). 
Powers was most interested in comparing the overall level of spending 
on welfare of these two TANF regimes to the actual level of spending 
under AFDC over the period, but she also calculated a measure of vari 
ability for each state under each scenario from a regression of the log 
change in expenditures on the log change in the unemployment rate 
over the period 1976-1995. She found that the estimated relationship 
under each of the three scenarios is zero for most states, suggesting 
that AFDC/TANF spending is not related in a systematic way to the 
cycle. The reliability of this result is weakened by the fact that the 
effects of unemployment are estimated contemporaneously, while 
other studies show that the biggest effect of unemployment on case 
loads occurs some 18 months after an increase in unemployment.
Boyd and Davis (1998) focused on the national recessions of 
1980-1982 and 1990-1991 and calculated the amount by which state 
spending on welfare would have increased due to rising unemployment 
if TANF had been in place (i.e., if states had been solely responsible 
for increased spending at the margin) and states had provided benefits 
to the resulting new cases consistent with existing state-specific benefit
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levels. In other words, they calculated the expenditure increase needed 
to maintain welfare spending during the past two recessions under a 
TANF-like regime. They allow the severity of recessions to vary from 
state to state according to actual experience, but the assumed responses 
under a TANF regime are not allowed to vary. Thus, their findings 
reflect how states with varying economic conditions, benefit levels, and 
caseloads might have reacted had TANF been in place during the past 
two recessions.
It is useful to compare these assumed responses under Boyd and 
Davis to actual state behavior during the most recent recession. Cali 
fornia and Michigan both cut their nominal benefit levels substantially, 
though California had a big increase in caseloads (37 percent from 
1990 to 1994) while Michigan's caseloads were approximately con 
stant. New York and Texas kept nominal benefits unchanged despite 
substantial caseload growth. Thus, there was substantial variation in 
state responses to recessionary conditions.
Boyd and Davis found a wide range of expenditure increases across 
the states, reflecting the differences in the severity of recession and the 
generosity of welfare programs across the states. On average, the 
deeper recession of the early 1980s would have resulted in an increase 
in welfare expenditures (as a percentage of state general fund budgets) 
of 1 percent. This figure seems small, but when compared with an aver 
age of 3 percent for state expenditures on AFDC as a percentage of state 
general fund budgets, it can be viewed as important. Some states are hit 
much harder than others. California, in particular, was estimated to 
experience expenditure increases of over 2 percent in each of the reces 
sions, due to its higher-than-average benefit levels, higher-than-average 
case loads, and higher-than-average increase in unemployment during 
the recession of the early 1990s. In contrast, states in the southeast 
(with the exception of West Virginia) were estimated to experience 
below-average increases in expenditures as a share of their budgets 
under recession, in large part because of their low benefits.
Extrapolating from these findings to the next recession, Boyd and 
Davis seem to assume that states will succumb to fiscal pressures and 
reduce spending on welfare, but it is still an open question whether 
states will, in fact, choose to cut back welfare spending when the next 
recession occurs in the brave new world defined by TANF.
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Dye and McGuire's (forthcoming) analysis attempts to shed some 
light on this open question. They examine actual revenues and expen 
ditures, with an explicit focus on years of recession for each of the 49 
states that experienced contractions during the period 1977-1995 
(Florida did not experience a decline in gross state product [GSP], the 
measure of recession employed in the study, for any year during this 
period). The use of actual revenues and expenditures (as opposed to 
measures free of policy changes) is dictated by the lack of policy-fixed 
data for expenditures. An advantage to using actual revenues and 
expenditures is that they reflect not only automatic changes due to 
changes in economic conditions, but also the discretionary decisions of 
state decision makers, which is of interest in a study of the responses of 
states to economic distress.
For each state, Dye and McGuire calculate an elasticity of actual 
revenues (or expenditures) with respect to (declines in) GSP as the 
ratio of the percentage change in revenues (or expenditures) with 
respect to the percentage change (decline) in GSP. 6 They find that the 
calculated elasticity is negative for the individual income tax, the gen 
eral sales tax, and total tax revenues for many states and on average, 
indicating that discretionary decisions are taken to counter the effects 
on revenues of the economic downturn. Similar calculations result in 
negative elasticities on average for total nonwelfare spending (-1.68), 
public welfare spending (-7.58), AFDC spending (-1.27), expendi 
tures on K-12 education (-1.02), and expenditures on higher educa 
tion (-3.01), indicating that states on average increase spending on 
these categories during contractionary periods. 7 The fact that AFDC 
spending is countercyclical on average is not surprising given the 
nature of the program, but the fact that education and other nonwelfare 
spending is also countercyclical for most states is surprising. Dye and 
McGuire interpret this preliminary evidence as supportive of the idea 
that states tend to maintain spending across the board during reces 
sionary times. Since spending on nonwelfare programs is not financed 
by federal matching grants, it may not be unreasonable to expect states 
to increase taxes in order to maintain spending (including spending on 
welfare) even under TANK
Dye and McGuire caution that their results are preliminary and 
require greater exploration. In particular, state-specific behavior often 
differs from average behavior and is oftentimes not easily explained.
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For example, in contrast with the countercyclical findings for educa 
tion spending for the U.S. average, the elasticity during recessions for 
K-12 education spending in Massachusetts is calculated to be cyclical, 
while the elasticity for higher education is weakly countercyclical.
Taken together, the studies of actual state fiscal behavior during 
recessionary periods and the studies simulating state welfare spending 
under the new TANF block-grant arrangement point to a cautious con 
clusion that the next recession need not result in large cuts in welfare 
spending, and may well result in an effort by most states to maintain 
their welfare policies and programs even as new cases are generated by 
the economic contraction. This conclusion is cautious for several rea 
sons: 1) simulations outside of actual experience are always subject to 
wide margins of error; 2) the federal funding change for AFDC/TANF 
programs is dramatic and not just a change at the margin; and 3) sev 
eral states (for example, Mississippi, Idaho, and Pennsylvania in Dye 
and McGuire's analysis) do exhibit cyclical (as opposed to noncycli- 
cal) spending on welfare, even under the AFDC matching-rate funding 
arrangement.
In assessing the impact of the change from federal matching grants 
to block grants on state spending and revenues, bear in mind the small 
share of total state expenditures attributable to AFDC/TANF spending. 
The largest state public welfare program by far is Medicaid, and it is 
still financed by a matching grant from the federal government. Thus, 
overall spending on public welfare programs is likely to continue to be 
highly countercyclical.
Finally, we comment on the likely efficacy of the contingency fund 
implemented as part of the 1996 welfare reform act and designed to 
provide additional federal funding for states experiencing dire eco 
nomic conditions. Both Powers and Boyd and Davis note that states 
must spend at 100 percent of their 1994 levels in order to qualify for 
the contingency fund, a restriction that is likely to keep many states 
from qualifying. On the other hand, the argument that the fund at $2 
billion is insufficient to cover the increased spending of states in a 
recession is not wholly convincing, given Boyd and Davis's estimate of 
an expenditure increase for the aggregate of all states of $2.5 billion 
due to the recession of the early 1990s.
Boyd and Davis' estimate of $2.5 billion is significantly smaller 
than Levine's (1998) estimate of $7.3 billion over five years. The
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major reason for this difference is that Levine estimated a much larger 
expenditure response for a given increase in unemployment than the 
consensus estimates employed by Boyd and Davis. Second, Levine's 
estimates assumed sustained increases in spending over a longer period 
than Boyd and Davis. Levine's aggregate expenditure response 
appears implausibly high in light of the smaller state-specific responses 
simulated by Boyd and Davis. This conclusion is reinforced by the 
fact that Boyd and Davis assume that states would have maintained 
benefit levels and covered all eligible recipients with their own reve 
nues, if TANF had been in place during the previous two recessions. 
This is a generous assumption about state spending behavior. If states 
choose instead to cut benefit levels, as some did during the most recent 
recession, then the aggregate spending increase would be even smaller.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
A consensus seems to have emerged concerning the likely impact 
on welfare spending of a switch from matching to block grants. Recent 
econometric estimates suggest that the elasticity of spending with 
respect to matching rates is small, ranging from zero to 0.15. If cor 
rect—and there remains considerable uncertainty about the exact mag 
nitude of the price effects—these elasticities imply cuts in benefit 
levels of no more than 10 percent and declines in the state share of 25 
percent at most. Even this relatively modest response will not occur 
immediately, because the sharp drop in welfare caseloads has yielded a 
block grant windfall and reduced the budgetary pressure on states from 
welfare spending.
With regard to competition with other states, states do seem to fol 
low their neighbors in making adjustments to benefit levels. However, 
the results on this type of interdependency are weak enough—and the 
importance of unmeasured state characteristics strong enough—that 
we do not predict the dramatic convergence in benefit levels implied by 
the phrase "race to the bottom."
Regarding program substitution, over a 20-year time period, evi 
dence suggests that there has been considerable substitution between 
federal programs such as food stamps and SSI and shared state-federal
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programs. This substitution should accelerate under the incentives of a 
fixed block grant. Thus, looking ahead, say, 10 years or more, we 
speculate that state-financed cash assistance will be lower as a share of 
total welfare expenditures, including food stamp and Medicaid outlays.
We stress that considerable caution is warranted in predicting gov 
ernment behavior under any radical change in institutional setting. We 
have had several decades of experience with federal financing of 
AFDC under a generous matching grant; we have had less than two 
years of experience of federal financing of TANF under a generous 
block grant. Patience and diligence in monitoring state responses are 
called for.
At the same time, analyses of actual state fiscal behavior during 
recent periods of economic contraction are somewhat sanguine about 
the ability of the state sector to weather the next recession under the 
new TANF regime. This literature is very new and many unanswered 
questions remain. In addition, much of the analysis has not adequately 
accounted for behavioral changes in response to the new financing 
arrangements. The most encouraging evidence that state spending on 
welfare may not be dramatically reduced during the next (and first 
post-TANF) recession is provided by Dye and McGuire (forthcoming), 
who find that, with notable exceptions, most states did not reduce 
spending on nonwelfare programs, including K-12 and higher educa 
tion—programs not financed by matching grants from the federal gov 
ernment—during recent recessions. These results are provocative 
rather than definitive (there are some puzzling results state by state), 
but they suggest that state spending behavior during periods of declin 
ing gross state product (periods of economic and fiscal distress) may 
differ greatly from secular trends in spending and from state spending 
behavior in good times. Additional research is needed to understand 
the causes and consequences of decisions made by individual states 
concerning welfare spending in difficult economic times.
Notes
We thank Sheldon Danziger, Greg Duncan, Julie Cullen, and Bob Schoeni for 
helpful comments.
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1. Between 1991 and 1994, 11 states actually cut the nominal value of their maxi 
mum benefit level, while only 6 states increased benefits enough to maintain their 
real value.
2. The MOE requirement falls to 75 percent for states that meet federal work partic 
ipation rate requirements.
3. Under the AFDC matching rate regime, if a state cut benefits by a dollar or moved 
a recipient from AFDC to SSI, it saved only 40 cents for every dollar of reduced 
spending. Under TANF, it saves a full dollar. If the recipient also gets food 
stamps, when the states cuts cash benefits by a dollar, food stamp benefits go up 
by about 30 cents.
4. Disregards still vary substantially across states. For example, in California a fam 
ily gets to keep the first $225 in earnings per month and loses 50 cents per dollar 
thereafter. In Washington state, TANF benefits are reduced by 50 cents from the 
first dollar of earnings.
5. In FY97, 28 states reduced their own expenditures to the MOE minimum, 18 
states were below their 1994 level but above the minimum, and 5 states increased 
their expenditures relative to their 1994 levels of spending (Lazere 1998).
6. The authors experiment with different lag structures for spending and GSP and 
find the results to be fairly robust on average.
7. The findings of countercyclical spending on average are consistent with the 
results in Mattoon and Testa (1992).
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